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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ensminger pied guilty to one count of felony violation a no contact order. 
He received a unified of five years, with two and one-half fixed. 
Mr. Ensminger that the no contact order included on the judgment of conviction 
fails to meet with almost every requirement contained within Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 
and, therefore, this Court to vacate the no contact order entered by the district 
court as part of the judgment of conviction. Mr. Ensminger also contends that his 
sentence represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given 
any view of the facts. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Between September 12 and 28, 2013, Mr. Ensminger attempted to contact his 
ex-wife by telephone 7 4 times while he was in jail.1 (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSl),2 pp.2-3.) At the time of the contact and attempted contact, there 
were several no contact orders in place between Mr. Ensminger and his ex-wife. (PSI, 
p.3.) 
As Mr. Ensminger had been convicted of two other no contact order violations in 
the past five years, he was charged by information with three counts of felony violation 
of a no contact order. (R., pp.43-45.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ensminger 
pied guilty to one count of felony violation of a no contact order. (4/21/14 Tr., p.26, L.3 
1 These were not hostile phone calls-each call began with either Mr. Ensminger or his 
ex-wife using a term of endearment such as "Hon" or "Dear." (PSI, p.56.) In fact, 
Mr. Ensminger's ex-wife advised law enforcement that she wanted Mr. Ensminger to 
stop calling only because she could not afford to keep accepting the collect calls. (PSI, 
p.56.) 
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- p.27, L.1; R., pp.47-51.) Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the State 
agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts, not to file a persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement, not to file additional charge in police reports numbers 13-3769 and 14-
6667, and to recommend a sentence of five years, with three years fixed, concurrent 
with Mr. Ensminger's Ada County case. 3 (4/21/14 Tr., p.6, L.6 - p.8, L.16; R., p.52.) 
The district court accepted Mr. Ensminger's guilty plea and ordered a PSI. (4/21/14 
Tr., p.26, L.15 - p.27, L.21; R., p.52.) 
At the sentencing hearing on June 2, 2014, the State recommended a sentence 
of five years, with three years fixed. (6/2/14 Tr., p.35, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Ensminger's counsel 
recommended a unified sentence of two years, with one year fixed. (6/2/14 Tr., p.42, 
Ls.23-25.) The district court sentenced Mr. Ensminger to five years, with two and one-
half years fixed, and ordered that the time be served concurrently with the sentence for 
Mr. Ensminger's other conviction. (6/2/14 Tr., p.65, Ls.10-16; R., pp.57-60.) 
At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Ensminger asked the district court to remove or 
modify the no contact order the State asked to be entered against him. (6/2/14 
Tr., p.38, Ls.25.) The district court denied the motion and entered a new no contact 
order prohibiting Mr. Ensminger from having contact with Mr. Ensminger's ex-wife, 
Leann Mayden, for five years. (6/2/14 Tr., p.39, L.16 - p.40, L.4; R., p.55.) However, 
the written judgment of conviction also contained a no contact order provision which 
utilized the language "shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the victim, Leann 
Mayden" but reflected no expiration date. (6/2/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-4; R., p.58.) 
2 The designation PSI shall refer to the electronic file containing the PSI and all 
documents attached to the PSI. 
3 Mr. Ensminger had been sentenced to five years, with two years fixed, in Ada County 
case number 2013-10290, in which he was convicted of a felony no contact order 
violation. (6/2/14 Tr., p.36, Ls.8-10, p.43, Ls.4-8, 65, Ls.12-13.) 
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1. Diel the district court err when it entered a no contact order in the judgment of 
conviction that is invalid due to a lack of any discernible date of expiration and 
fails to conform to the requirements of I.C.R. 46.2? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Ensminger to a 
unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, following his 




The District Court Erred When It Entered A No Contact Order Within The Judgment Of 
Conviction As It Is Invalid Because It Contains No Discernible Date Of Expiration And 
Fails To Conform With The Requirements Of I.C.R. 46.2 
At sentencing, over Mr. Ensminger's objection, the district court a no 
contact order against Mr. Ensminger that continues to be in force. (R., p.55.) At the 
time, Mr. Ensminger objected to the entry of a no contact order and moved the court to 
either remove or to modify the no contact order so that he would be able to have written 
contact with his ex-wife. (6/2/14 Tr., p.38,L.16 - p.39, L.5.) Although the district court 
noted that the ex-wife wished to have contact with Mr. Ensminger, and the did not 
object to written communications, the district court nonetheless found the relationship to 
be "unhealthy" and put in place a five year no contact order which prohibited contact of 
any kind between the two parties. (6/2/14 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-15, p.39, Ls.6-13, p.39, L.21 
p.40, L.4; R., p.55.) On appeal, Mr. Ensminger does not challenge this properly entered 
no contact order. However, in addition to entering a no contact order on the Ada 
County form (R., p.55), the district court also included a proviso on the judgment of 
conviction that prohibited Mr. Ensminger from having contact with his ex-wife, 
(R., p.58.) This proviso contained no end date and otherwise did not comply with the 
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 and I.C. § 18-920. (R., p.58.) Mr. Ensminger contends that 
the no contact order proviso contained within the judgment of conviction is invalid 
because it fails to contain a date of expiration, and fails to comport with the 
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2. 
This Court exercises free review over the question of whether a criminal no 
contact order is entered in compliance with relevant statutes and court rules. State v. 
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Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175 (2008). Criminal no contact orders are authorized under 
I.C. § 18-920, which permits the district court to enter a no contact order when a 
defendant is charged with, or convicted of, a list of enumerated offenses, or for "any 
other offense for which a court finds that a no contact order is appropriate." I.C. § 18-
920(1 ). This statute makes it a criminal offense to violate such a no contact order. 
I.C. § 18-920. The specific minimum requirements for issuance of such an order are 
enumerated in I.C.R. 46.2 which provides, in pertinent part, that: 
(a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in 
writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district 
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that 
district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the 
following information: 
Cl) The case number, defendant's name and victim's name; 
(2) A distance restriction; 
(3) That the order will expire at 11 :59 p.m. on a specific date, or 
upon dismissal of the case; 
( 4) An advisory that: 
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a 
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail 
will be set until an appearance before a judge, and 
the possible penalties for this crime, 
(b) The no contact order can only be modified by a judge, 
and 
( c) When more than one domestic violence protection 
order is in place, the most restrictive provision will 
control any conflicting terms of any other civil or 
criminal protection order. 
I.C.R. 46.2(a) (emphasis added). 
Virtually none of the advisories that are mandated for a valid no contact order 
under I.C.R. 46.2 are found in the no contact order that was entered by the district court 
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in the judgment of conviction. This order was set forth in its entirety within 
Mr. Ensminger's judgment of conviction and provided: 'The defendant shall have no 
contact, directly or indirectly, with the victim, Leann Mayden." (R., p.58.) 
This order was not on a separate form as required by I.C.R. 46.2(a). The order 
contains no distance restriction whatsoever. See I.C.R. 46.2{a)(2). The order does not 
contain a date of termination. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3); see also Castro, 145 Idaho at 175 
(holding that the amendment of I.C.R. 46.2 to require inclusion of a date of termination 
was necessary as it was contrary to public policy to permit criminal no contact orders to 
remain in "enshrined perpetuity"). There is no advisory in this order at all regarding any 
of the potential criminal penalties that may be imposed - as a separate criminal offense 
- for a violation of this order; that the order could only be modified by a judge; or that, if 
another no contact order or domestic violence protection order is in place, that the more 
restrictive provisions would control what contacts are permitted. See I.C.R. 46.2(a)(4 ). 
Each of the required provisions and advisories for a valid no contact order under 
I.C.R. 46.2(a) are either deficient, or entirely absent from, the no contact order entered 
as part of the judgment in this case. These requirements are not merely procedural 
formalities that have little bearing on the overall validity of a criminal no contact order. 
The requisite information is essential in order to comport with due process requirements 
as to notice to those impacted by such a no contact order. 
Due process requires that the charged individual have prior notice of the no-
contact order before criminal liability can be imposed on the basis of an alleged violation 
of that order's terms. "It is well established that a conviction under a criminal enactment 
which does not give adequate notice that the conduct charged is prohibited is violative 
of due process." Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963). In fact, even when the 
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regulation at issue is a prison rule, as opposed to a criminal statute, due process 
requires fair notice that the conduct at issue is prohibited before a sanction can be 
imposed. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619,622 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Regarding penal laws of general applicability, satisfying the notice requirement 
demanded by due process is fairly straightforward - the statute itself that defines a 
criminal offense is generally deemed to put the public on notice as to what conduct may 
or may not subject them to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 
87 4, 880 (Ct. App. 2000). As was noted by the Wilson Court, "it is axiomatic that 
citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law once such laws are 
passed." Id. 
But no-contact orders that are entered solely against a particular individual are 
different. Unlike criminal statutes, which define criminal offenses generally and apply to 
all those subject to the laws of Idaho, criminal no-contact orders are issued solely 
against one individual and are frequently directed at contacts that would be entirely 
legal in absence of the individualized order. See I.C. § 18-920. In addition, no person 
may be arrested for the offense of violation of a no-contact order without a warrant 
unless there is probable cause to believe both that the person has violated the no-
contact order and that the person had prior notice of the order. I.C. § 18-920( 4 ). 
In sum, the district court's no contact order entered as part of the judgment in this 
case fails to meet with virtually every mandatory requirement for criminal no contact 
orders set forth in I.C.R. 46.2(a). However, this Court treats the provisions of a 
sentence relating to criminal no contact orders as severable from the remaining 
sentence. See State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75 (2002). Accordingly, where the no 
contact order is invalid, this Court will vacate the no contact order as a severable 
8 
provision from the underlying judgment of conviction and sentence. Id. Mr. Ensminger 
therefore asks that this Court vacate the no contact order entered by the district court as 
part of the judgment of conviction and remand this case for entry of an amended 
judgment of conviction omitting all no contact provisos. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Ensminger To A 
Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Following His 
Plea Of Guilty To Felony Violation Of A No Contact Order 
Mr. Ensminger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
five years, with two and one-half years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Ensminger does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Ensminger must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
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In light of Mr. Ensminger's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its 
discretion in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact 
that Mr. Ensminger had support in the community (should the no contact order be lifted 
or modified) and that, with programming, Mr. Ensminger could likely be successful in the 
community. (PSI, pp.252-53.) 
Mr. Ensminger has strong support from family members and friends. See 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 ( 1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who 
had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Ensminger's 
ex-wife wrote a supportive letter to the district court which advised that she was not 
afraid of Mr. Ensminger and in which she advocated treatment for Mr. Ensminger, not 
prison time. (PSI, pp.252-53.) Further, Mr. Ensminger desperately wants to be able to 
help his adult daughter and her young son. Mr. Ensminger told the district court at 
sentencing that the main reason he was trying to contact his ex-wife in violation of the 
no contact order(s) was to try to find his grandson, whom Mr. Ensminger believed his 
daughter was in the process of giving up for adoption. (6/2/14 Tr., p.46, L.24 - p.47, 
L.1, p.60, Ls.12-14; PSI, p.13.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires 
the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Ensminger reported a history of mental illness, 
specifically, Bipolar Disorder. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Ensminger believes an evaluation and 
treatment may be helpful to him; however, no evaluation was ordered by the district 
court. (PSI, pp.17-18.) Mr. Ensminger was diagnosed with bipolar disorder while at the 
Idaho Department of Correction in 2007. (PSI, p.15.) As a result of the bipolar disorder, 
Mr. Ensminger experiences depression and mood swings. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Ensminger 
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also has epilepsy, which caused a severe strain on his family when he was younger. 
(PSI, pp.11-12, 14.) He is taking medication to manage both the epilepsy and his 
bipolar disorder. (PSI, pp.14-15.) 
Further, Mr. Ensminger expressed remorse for his acts. Mr. Ensminger told the 
PSI investigator that he felt bad about committing the crime. (PSI, p.4.) Idaho 
recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his 
conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 
(1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Ensminger asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts 
that had the district court properly considered his mental health condition and remorse, 
it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ensminger respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction containing the no contact provision. Mr. Ensminger also requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his 
case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 26th day of December, 2014. 
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